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Abstract
This paper considers in detail the ontological and normative presuppositions of the state-contingent approach to pricing 
commodities first introduced by Arrow (Le rôle des valeurs boursières pour la répartition la meilleure des risques. Econo-
métrie, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1953) in his model of general equilibrium under uncertainty, 
which became a milestone in the theory of finance. By contextualizing Arrow’s fundamental contribution and subsequent 
developments in finance, it demonstrates how this new conceptual framework implied certain technologies—both intellectual 
and financial. In showing how theoretical thinking about finance was underlying institutional developments in finance, this 
paper complements the familiar narrative of the performativity of economics.
Keywords Performativity · General equilibrium · State pricing approach · Arrow securities · Market socialism · 
Normativity
Finance—as a sector of the economy and as a form of eco-
nomic knowledge (this ambiguity is crucial for my analy-
sis)—has relatively recently drawn scholarly attention. One 
of the obvious reasons for that is the huge rise of the finan-
cial sector, a notorious ‘financialization,’ coupled with (both 
real and expected or imaginary) global instabilities associ-
ated with it. But this does not explain the renewed attention 
paid to the theory of finance—or, one can also say, to the 
economic theory underlying finance.
In his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx 
demonstrated that the criticism of a certain form of knowl-
edge is a prerequisite of social criticism, because knowledge 
(in Marx’s case—philosophy) is an ideal extension of the 
real social world. By scrutinizing the abstractions of social 
science, for example the ontology of financial models, we 
thus contribute to a better understanding of the rationales 
behind real financial worlds. I will demonstrate that certain 
concepts in (financial) economics are to be interpreted as 
social technologies aimed at solving some specific problems. 
It is in this way that economic models become part of the 
institutional infrastructure of markets.
In his superb and wide-ranging history of financial eco-
nomics, focused on the notion of performativity, MacKenzie 
(2006a, b) reformulates this insight in a more precise sense, 
by treating theoretical finance as a set of important technolo-
gies that radically transformed the institutional structure and 
functioning of the financial markets.
MacKenzie, however, does not mention one important 
stream of literature which, however, one could argue, has 
become foundational for the theory of finance. This stream 
is connected to the seminal contribution of Arrow (1953) 
which initiated the general equilibrium analysis in finance. 
In this paper, I will argue that Arrow inaugurated a new 
way of structuring the world in order to make sense of what 
finance was about. I will also consider Arrow’s approach in 
the context of his other writings, which should help dem-
onstrate how it may be linked to the idea of performativ-
ity, which should complement the familiar discussion of the 
Black–Scholes model.
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1  Arrow on Finance
Arrow’s short paper, conceived as an extention of the gen-
eral equilibrium analysis to the case of uncertainty1 and 
published, curiously, before the now classical general equi-
librium model (Arrow and Debreu 1954) appeared in print, 
has become a milestone in financial economics. How could 
that happen?
Once the need was perceived to go beyond certainty in 
the standard framework of rational choice and general equi-
librium, finance became the obvious domain of application: 
social technologies of financial world routinely deal with 
uncertain future.
The uncertain world in this framework is a world par-
titioned into various possible states. A timing problem is 
immediate here, but since we are in a model world, we either 
simply assume that we are at a point 0 of the present and 
there is only uncertainty about the future states of the world, 
or we consider the complete ‘history’ of the world from its 
inception. What is important in this representation is the 
idea that the there are mutually exclusive subsets of states 
(usually called ‘events’) which would form a partition and 
allow us to represent the future as a tree of possibilities, fully 
known to us at the outset. This description of uncertainty 
looks much more ‘fundamental’ and general than any other 
of the kind (see Drèze 1974).
The market for contingent commodities is a natural gener-
alization of the familiar general equilibrium logic, the most 
‘general’ general equilibrium one might have—and the tri-
umph of formalization (Duffie and Sonnenschein 1989). In 
this economy, agents buy and sell not ordinary, but contin-
gent commodities, and the efficient allocation is obtained in 
the ‘beginning’ of the world, before the ‘true’ state of nature 
is revealed. They buy not an umbrella, but, say, an umbrella 
in Paris, at a certain date, given the fact that it rains.2
Starting with contingent commodities, Arrow demon-
strated that we can rule out the (fully utopian) idea of hav-
ing markets for each commodity in each state of the world 
and thus reduce the complexity associated with uncertainty. 
Arrow’s idea was to substitute the complete set of markets 
(for each contingent commodity) by the combination of 
securities trading and spot markets in commodities after 
the uncertainty is revealed. With a complete set of securi-
ties markets (for each state of the world, there is an inde-
pendent security dividend vector), any consumption plan 
can thus be financed with certainty. Crucially, each agent 
in Arrow–Debreu economy has the same information—and 
the same correct beliefs—about the equilibrium spot prices 
at all the future dates.3
Thus, the very existence of financial markets, the exist-
ence of securities trading, achieved the most fundamental 
theoretical justification. On Arrow’s view, finance was 
exactly about risk and the ‘allocation of risk-bearing’, that 
is, exchanging financial securities that ‘cover’ different states 
of the world. In the 1960s, this approach was adopted for 
financial economics by Hirshleifer (1965, 1966) and Myers 
(1968).
Arrow coined the idea of special ‘Arrow securities’ pay-
ing one unit of wealth if a given state occurs and nothing 
otherwise. He recalled the genealogy himself:
In trying to incorporate uncertainty into general equi-
librium theory, I was led by the Wald–Savage view-
point to consider an elementary decision as one that 
took a unit value for one state of nature and zero else-
where; thus all general decisions could be regarded as 
bundles of elementary decisions. (Arrow 1983, p. 47)4
This code-like treatment5 also provided a very elementary 
and intuitive basis for subsequent formalization. The set of 
Arrow securities forms a basis in the vector space of all pay-
offs: each particular asset can be represented as a portfolio 
of Arrow securities. Thus, the simple intuitions of risk and 
return are paired with a linear mathematical structure. This 
partition of the world transforms all scalar variables into 
vectors: payoff of a particular asset becomes a vector, its ele-
ments being payoffs for this asset in a particular states of the 
world, while portfolios of assets are immediately formalized 
as vectors as well. Each portfolio becomes an instrument for 
dealing with possible future states.
In a perfect world of ‘complete market’ (one can buy an 
Arrow security for each possible future state), a portfolio 
of Arrow securities forms a benchmark for valuing each 
particular asset. Moreover, Arrow–Debreu prices (that is, 
prices of Arrow securities) play a key role in this context. In 
a very basic sense, they are used to ‘price’ the states of the 
world: by paying a particular amount for an Arrow security, 
1 Here and elsewhere, I do not distinguish ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in 
the well-known Knightian sense—following my protagonist, Arrow, 
who worked toward ‘displacing’ the latter with the former (Schliesser 
2012). This does not mean that I endorse this displacement, moreo-
ver, the story I am going to tell should further reinforce this important 
distinction.
2 In a lucid depiction by Radner (1970, p. 455), “a ‘market’ is organ-
ized before the beginning of the physical history of the economic 
system. An elementary contract in this market will consist of the 
purchase (or sale) of some specified number of units of a specified 
commodity to be delivered at a specified location and date, if and 
only if a specified elementary event occurs.”
3 On Duffie and Sonnenschein’s (1989) interpretation, this also 
amounts to the idea of a fulfilled expectations equilibrium.
4 In Savage (1954/1972, p. 9) we find a definition of a state of the 
world as a description leaving no relevant aspect of the world unde-
scribed and of events as sets of states.
5 On Arrow securities as a code see in more detail: Boldyrev (2016).
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one pays for certainty in acquiring one unit of wealth in 
a particular state—that is why they are simply referred to 
as ‘state prices’, reflecting values of particular states for a 
rational actor. Uncertainty is thus ‘priced’, and the future 
becomes ‘marketed’ in a very deep sense of the word: the 
bits of future become subject to optimal allocation. This 
has consequences for the basics of the modern finance: It is 
relatively easy to show that for the famous (and essential) 
no-arbitrage condition in financial economics to hold, it is 
necessary and sufficient that a nonnegative vector of state 
prices exists such that each asset is priced by its returns 
weighed by those state prices (Varian 1987).
1.1  What Role Did Arrow’s Theory Play?
First and foremost, Arrow and Debreu6 provided the most 
general framework available for dealing with asset pricing 
problems. If general equilibrium was treated as the most 
basic structure of all rigorous economics, the same should be 
true for financial economics as well. The lacking foundations 
of finance were finally discovered.
Second, and equally general, Arrow’s argument demon-
strated the precise role played by financial securities and, 
generally, by financial markets. Instead of accounting for 
every possible state of the world, it promised a radical reduc-
tion of complexity. Securities were considered as mathemati-
cal machines reallocating risks and adjusting the world to the 
changes in its structure constantly supplied every time new 
events arrive, that is, every time the uncertainty is replaced 
by certainty.
Finally, Arrow’s argument suggested a set of heuristic 
strategies—or technologies—to complete the market. In the 
incomplete market world, the investors are allowed to change 
their portfolio structures over time and to apply dynamic 
trading strategies (Rubinstein 1987, 2006). This immedi-
ately leads to the Black–Scholes argument, in which only 
two assets are used to replicate the payoffs of any derivative 
asset. Arbitrage-free pricing of derivatives, establishing an 
‘equilibrium’ benchmark for them, was thus a direct heir of 
Arrow’s approach. This new technology has become very 
powerful, and it was this idea that finally was realized in the 
Black–Scholes pricing scheme. I wish to dwell on this role 
of Arrow’s theory.
2  Performativity of General Equilibrium?
General equilibrium analysis is a rigorous theory of the 
economy as a whole. As such, it was associated—in fact, 
very early, starting from its founder, Walras himself and then 
from scholars such as Barone (1908/1935)—with a norma-
tive ideal of perfectly planned economy. General equilibrium 
provided both the overall image of an ideally functioning 
system of markets and some sort of a cognitive infrastruc-
ture, set of techniques (of which the most immediate was the 
very equilibration of supply and demand—be it through an 
auctioneer or, later, through the ‘central planning board’) 
that would allow an equilibrium to be achieved—and thus 
‘performed’. How does Arrow fit into this picture?
Interestingly, the genuine techniques of general equilib-
rium analysis—fixed-point theorems—were also used at that 
time in the context of performativity—in the guise of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. In particular, Grunberg and Modigliani 
(1954) used it to demonstrate that public predictions may 
turn out to be correct, since there exists at least one (fixed) 
point at which the predicted parameter is actually observed 
(see also Hands 1990). But I would like to dwell on those 
applications that were more immediately connected to the 
normative interpretation of general equilibrium.
Recently, Eric Schliesser (2012) has demonstrated in 
detail that Arrow played a significant role in ‘displacing’ 
the idea of unmeasurable uncertainty—first by his influential 
survey paper (Arrow 1951) and then by his model of contin-
gent commodities in which subjective probabilities of states 
of the world were assumed as being known by the agents.7
Underlying Schliesser’s illuminating analysis is the idea 
that these displacements, whereby fundamental (or, in his 
parlance, ‘metaphysical’) uncertainty of the social world 
turned into quantifiable risk or formalizable randomness, are 
due to the normative policy concerns which require much 
less ambiguity than the Knightian (or Keynesian) concept 
of uncertainty could possibly deliver.
It is this element, which I find crucial in Arrow’s 
approach, but which is rarely appreciated. For Arrow in the 
1950s, a significant element of the theoretical programme in 
economics was to find an unambiguous normative welfare 
benchmark (hence such an attention paid to the proofs of the 
welfare theorems)—an idealized representation of markets 
6 The question of priority is a difficult one. Arrow (1953) is the first 
formulation of the framework with the ideas of state pricing and 
spanning, while Debreu (1959) is a more general treatment integrat-
ing production and multi-period framework. In financial economics, 
Arrow’s paper is mostly cited, while Debreu is credited with estab-
lishing the ultimate general equilibrium results on the highest level of 
generality.
7 Schliesser also notes that Arrow (1951), curiously, opened up 
another strategy by referring to Alchian (1950) who had suggested 
taming uncertainty in a more sophisticated way—by reinterpreting it 
not as quantifiable risk, but as randomness. Alchian suggested mode-
ling decisions in face of fundamental uncertainty as steps in a random 
sequence. This, Schliesser (2012) argues, paved the way to the more 
sophisticated ‘displacement strategy’ that then grew into the theory of 
efficient markets as stochastic processes.
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that would allow to look at the real-world inefficiencies and 
deviations from this vision.
Indeed, Arrow’s attitude toward his model of uncer-
tainty has been compatible with his overall idea of general 
equilibrium:
This general equilibrium or, equivalently, the notion of 
ideal insurance markets, can act as a normative back-
ground for evaluating the efficiency of risk-bearing in 
the real world. (Arrow 1966, p. 269)
At the same time, commentators agree that both Arrow 
(1953) and Black and Scholes (1973) made unreasonable 
assumptions, sometimes bordering on insanity: in the for-
mer case, for the equilibrium to be achieved, even with the 
introduction of securities, the agents should correctly pre-
dict the state prices, while in the latter case constant volatil-
ity is assumed; indeed, the two assumptions are equivalent 
(Rubinstein 2006). How can we circumvent the unrealistic 
assumptions in these financial models? Or else how can we 
account for them?
One important feature of this lack of realism is an internal 
coherence, or closure, of the models: once we assume the 
perfect foresight or the constant volatility, the model does 
its work perfectly well. Perhaps for this reason equilibrium 
models of this kind are notoriously normative: they describe 
an ideal state of affairs and they invite us to find ways to 
achieve this benchmark.
If we recall what kind of work Arrow was doing in 1950s 
and 1960s, along with other prominent economists, such as 
Tjalling Koopmans and Leonid Hurwicz (see the general 
account in Mirowski 2002), we will better see the blueprints 
of this research program. Rationality in the Cowles com-
mission has been reinterpreted as a normative ideal to be 
followed, rather than a descriptive empirical theory (Herfeld 
2018), while the idea of general equilibrium was accompa-
nied by a precise welfarist interpretation which gave it an 
explicit normative meaning. The genealogy of general equi-
librium economics and its intimate links to market socialism 
(Lange 1936) clearly associate the very notion of equilib-
rium with a planning tool.
Now, as shown elsewhere (Boldyrev and Ushakov 2016), 
the overarching view of market socialists was very early rec-
ognized as an excessively ambitious enterprise. And still—
while general equilibrium was never implemented—it was 
intended to be implemented. Whether one wished to use it 
literally, as a planning tool, or just as a benchmark, it was 
believed to be the best representation of socially optimal 
state of affairs. The plethora of approaches relinquish-
ing some key assumptions (such as the one of perfect or 
symmetric information), including, interestingly, Arrow 
(1963) himself, led to the emergence of whole new fields 
of research, in which, again, the optimality of the general 
equilibrium, its normative status were never questioned.
These transformations of economics also involved—and 
inspired—a set of new approaches to the problem of arriv-
ing at equilibrium. If the total planning, performed by the 
omniscient Walrasian auctioneer was unattainable,8 still 
some more piecemeal approaches could be tried out. One 
direction most immediately connected to the general equi-
librium program—via the work of Hurwicz—was mecha-
nism design that involved game-theoretic formulations, but 
also was conceptually connected to the general equilibrium 
literature.
I suggest that we analyze Arrow’s contribution in this 
particular context. The dynamics is analogous: theoretical 
foundations laid by Arrow implied that perfect planning and 
perfect competition are indistinguishable and that it is help-
ful to look for the conditions a real economy must fulfill 
in order for general equilibrium to be attainable (this was 
also, arguably, the content of the so-called ‘stability of equi-
librium’ literature). Note that Arrow’s (1953) analysis of 
uncertainty is done with the same aim: it established quasi-
concavity of utility functions (that is, individual risk aver-
sion) as a sufficient condition of the viability of competitive 
equilibrium.9
That is why the modifications in the general equilibrium 
programme should be considered both from a theoretical and 
from a normative, or political, point of view. It was not just 
a question of ‘integrating’ uncertainty into general equilib-
rium theory—it was, at the same time, the question of mas-
tering, or governing, uncertainty—of social technologies 
that might be helpful in this.
Uncertainty was, of course, perceived as a challenge for 
any planning paradigm, including a market socialist one. 
I omit here the discussion of the different types of uncer-
tainty—in particular uncertainty of environment vs. uncer-
tainty about the actions of other agents. This was later 
emphasized by Radner (1968) who tried to reformulate 
Arrow’s approach and to ‘save’ the major results in the case 
of heterogeneous information.10 Just note that, in a sense, the 
game-theoretic mechanism design reformulation of general 
equilibrium analysis accounts for precisely this difference. 
The notion of incentive compatibility used in the game-the-
oretic literature is a technology aimed at overcoming the 
uncertainty about the actions of other agents. An almost 
simultaneous emergence of Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu 
results, which were disastrous for the general equilibrium 
8 The analysis by Arrow, Hurwicz, Scarf and, finally, Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu implied that, in general, it is, indeed, the case. See 
Boldyrev and Ushakov (2016) for more historical details.
9 As it later turned out (and is noted by Arrow in the English version 
of his paper—see Arrow 1964), this condition is inessential.
10 See also an incisive comment in Schliesser (2016).
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theory (see on that Rizvi 1994, 2006), also contributed to 
this move from general equilibrium to game theory.
Arrow’s version of the market socialist argument intro-
duced a set of ingenious techniques to master the uncer-
tainty. A traditional form of market socialism implied that 
markets (or a planning mechanism fully imitating markets) 
could solve the allocation problem in an optimal way. In case 
of (always measurable) uncertainty, the problem became 
still more intricate: in this more complex structure of the 
world, the risk became the major issue. The actual power 
of Arrow’s argument in this sphere lies not solely in ‘mar-
ketization’ of risks, but also in using financial securities as 
substitutes for (missing) markets.
It was Arrow who first introduced a new element into the 
ontology of economic models. A more general term for this 
new element of the economic world is ‘contingent claim’, 
that is, a contract attached to some uncertain event. The 
boom of the options market in the 1970s made it possible 
that interest of economists moved from the world of ‘deter-
ministic’ demand and supply to the (arguably more general) 
idea of contingent claims.
We know how things developed in financial economics: 
Black, Scholes and Merton constructed an arbitrage-free 
pricing theory, in which rational agents reconsidered their 
portfolios at each moment of time and in which this dynamic 
hedging strategy was used as a technology to complete the 
market (Rubinstein 2006). In fact, the notion of equilibrium, 
of complete market, and of the lack of arbitrage could be 
used interchangeably as normative blueprints for a socially 
optimal financial system. Moreover, the most mathemati-
cally elaborate version of Black–Scholes analysis (Harrison 
and Kreps 1979), which treats uncertainty as a stochastic 
process, explicitly draws on Arrow’s idea of ‘spanning’11 
and complete markets. In this approach, arbitrage-free pric-
ing of contingent claims involves re-arranging the probabili-
ties of agents so that an arbitrage-free price of a security is 
equal to its expected price.
And while the agents in the financial sector, who are 
constantly seeking new profit opportunities, are as remote 
as possible from the agents in a perfectly planned socialist 
economy, accepting equilibrium prices set by the Central 
Planning Board, the analysis of MacKenzie (2006a, b) sug-
gests that the distance might indeed be not so big. In fact, 
the agents on financial markets were, perhaps on a smaller 
scale, guided in their decisions by the ‘equilibrium’ tech-
nologies—or collective calculation devices—designed by 
financial economists. This guidance also helped legitimize 
option markets as a way to additionally hedge individual 
risks. But the key was, again, a rational—equilibrium, 
arbitrage-free—pricing, the cornerstone of neoclassical 
economics.
These performative effects were also linked to the fact 
that the assumptions underlying the model—referring to 
some social facts—were becoming more realistic:
To the extent that the availability of the Black-Scholes-
Merton model played a part in the processes reducing 
transaction costs, the increased capacity to exploit dis-
crepancies [between theoretical and real prices] was a 
performative effect of the model because the model 
facilitated the trading that moved patterns of prices 
towards its postulates. (MacKenzie 2006a, p. 48).
The surprising effects of financial economics on the financial 
sector thus exemplify two tendencies at work: an author-
ity of economists and economic knowledge (see the recent 
overview in Hirschman and Popp Berman 2014); and the 
tendency of economists themselves to infer unambiguous 
and clear normative guidance from the ideal pictures of opti-
mality they draw in their models.12
3  Taking stock
For the unsophisticated reader, the description of the world 
provided by Arrow (1953) seems bizarre. In assuming full 
knowledge of the future probabilities, it demonstrates ‘a 
cavalier treatment of how agents arrive at their expectations’ 
(Duffie and Sonnenschein 1989, p. 590) and are thus able to 
coordinate their actions. Its Wittgensteinian logical structur-
ing of the world of (future uncertain) events, however, was 
in line with a general tendency of economists to rational-
ize the real world—or at least to come up with normative 
ideas envisaging possible ways of such a rationalization. The 
idea of complete markets reappeared not only in finance, but 
also in macroeconomics, where representative agent mod-
els with rational expectations did not differ much neither 
from the idea of a complete market13 nor, at least formally, 
from a Soviet mathematical economics concepts of planning 
(Hands 2016).
As for the financial economics, this normative dimen-
sion turned out to play an important role as well. Arrow’s 
notions of complete markets, spanning, or elementary 
11 A ‘span’ of a given security refers to the set of cash flows (and, 
thus, of consumption possibilities) generated by this security.
12 Cf. a recent characteristic statement by Jean Tirole (2017, p. 86): 
‘More than other social sciences, economics claims to be normative; 
it aspires to “change the world.”’
13 ‘When one unpacked the “expectations” language of the rational 
expectations literature, it turned out that these models assumed that 
agents formed expectations of futures and contingency prices that 
were consistent with the aggregate plans being made, and hence were 
in fact competitive general equilibrium prices in a model of complete 
futures and contingency markets.’ (Foley 1999, 90).
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securities were not just concepts used to conveniently for-
malize abstract ideas of resource (here: risk) allocation. 
Their immediate implications were the proliferation of con-
tingent claims analysis, arbitrage-free pricing methods, the 
idea of risk-neutral pricing—the technologies that were used 
to bring the disequilibrium world of financial assets closer 
to its equilibrium portrayal and, in this sense, to ‘perform’ 
financial economics (MacKenzie 2006a). As Idabouk (2010, 
p. 139) notes,
the mere fact that the construction of Mathematical 
Finance was interwoven with financial engineering 
concerns stresses the normative role of mathematical 
models also from the standpoint of financial practice.
So, the lessons we can draw from this historical sketch 
are twofold. The first one urges us to rethink intellectual 
genealogy of modern finance and to remember that both its 
technical aspects and its deeper intellectual commitments 
owe a lot to the mainstream economics as it crystallized at 
places such as Cowles commission in the 1950–1960s, with 
a heavy influence of market socialism and (perhaps implicit) 
normative vision of its own role as science. Second, and 
related to that: economic/financial concepts, even the most 
abstract mathematical ones, are often entangled with certain 
social technologies, with rules and practices implied by the 
models, with ways to implement the ideas set forth in the 
formal mathematical frameworks and expressed in a nor-
mative way that prompts such attempts at implementation. 
This makes the initial ambiguity of the word ‘finance’ not 
so ambiguous, after all.
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